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Abstract
This paper analyzes multi-stage taxation by provinces in a federal country, using a two- 
good, two-province, two-stage successive differentiated-product symmetric oligopoly model, 
where each producer is located in a province and sells its product through exclusive retailers 
located in both provinces. Retailers compete for consumers a la Bertrand with differentiated 
products. The producer-retailer setup allows provincial governments to raise taxes on both 
upstream and downstream links of the value chain.
We solve a simultaneous and non-cooperative tax competition problem, where (symmet­
ric) provinces choose tax rates to maximize welfare subject to a revenue constraint. We Gnd 
that provinces set tax rates to either raise revenue at only one segment of the value chain 
or use a combination of upstream and downstream taxation. This choice is determined by 
the revenue requirement, the size of the market and the degree of downstream competition. 
We characterize and discuss each possible case.
Comparing the results of this model with the Leviathan case (analyzed in a previous 
paper by the authors) where governments behave as revenue maximizers, we Gnd that there 
is a threshold on revenue requirement such that welfarist governments tend to behave qual- 
itatively similar to Leviathan governments when revenue need exceed the threshold: they 
both choose a combination of taxes if products have some degree of heterogeneity, whereas 
they rely on downstream taxation when products are homogeneous. This way we provide 
a rationale for raising taxes on successive taxation even when governments internalize the 
effect of successive taxation on welfare.
Keywords: local indirect taxation, multistage taxes, tax competition, welfare taxation. 
JEL Codes: H71, H21, H22.
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Multi-stage taxation by subnational governments:
Welfare effects
1 Introduction
General taxes on goods and Services are an important source of fiscal revenue. They 
are top-of-the-list within indirect taxes, and are typically classified into value-added -or 
consumption- taxes, sales taxes, multi-stage cumulative taxes, excises, taxes on trade, 
etc. (following OECD’s classification). Other important sources of revenue are taxes on 
income (direct taxation on corporate or personal income or earnings) and property (direct 
taxation on wealth).
When the power to raise revenues is vested on a centralized level, fiscal authorities 
prefer VAT or sales taxes over multi-stage taxes. There is a reason for that: multi- 
stage taxation creates inefficiency along the value-chain (the so-called “cascade” effect).1 
Governments naturally internalize the double-margin effect from multi-stage taxation and 
prefer consumption or sales taxes over turnover taxes. In fact, countries that joined the 
European Community used to raise some form of turnover taxes, and replaced them for 
VAT during the mid-80s (Tait, 1988).
But multi-stage taxes arise as a preferred instrument at provincial levels, and although 
they are not widespread their popularity has been increasing in later years. For example, 
in Argentina provincial governments collect turnover taxes (impuesto sobre los ingresos 
brutos), which represent more than 70 percent of resources collected at provincial level.2 
Moreover, different versions of successive taxes are entering the scene again in developed 
federal countries. For example, in the US, the state of Washington collects a Business 
and Occupations tax, Ohio replaced a net income tax for a Commercial Activity Tax in
1 The cascade effect has long been studied by the public finance literature. See Friedlaender (1967).
2 We refer the reader to many papers of this tax in Argentina. See, for example, Núñez Miñana 
(1994), Libonatti (1998), Piffano (2005), Porto, Garriga and Rosales (2014) and the references therein.
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2014, and Nevada passed a version of Gross Receipt Tax in 2015. The current debate in 
Connecticut and other states suggest that this tax will gain relevance in the future (Ebel 
et al., 2016).
A previous paper (Cont and Fernandez Felices, 2016) analyzes whether successive 
taxation raised at provincial level can be optimal considering non-cooperative revenue 
maximizing governments (Leviathan) in a federal country. In the symmetric case (equal 
market sizes, retail costs and producer costs for both products) with no competition at the 
downstream level, we find a double taxation mark-up result -which mimics the standard 
producer-retailer relationship obtained in the industrial organization literature- with up- 
stream rates doubling downstream rates in equilibrium. As downstream competition gets 
stronger, provincial governments gradually switch from upstream to downstream taxation, 
eventually abandoning upstream taxation completely under product homogeneity. This 
result provides a strong ground for using successive taxation when provincial governments 
need to raise resources. The paper also obtains an over-taxation result (which is standard 
in the non-cooperative taxation literature).
This companion paper explores the robustness of these results when provincial gov­
ernments maximize welfare of the agents residing in the province, subject to a revenue 
requirement. In that sense, governments trade-off tax collection effects (obtained in a 
Leviathan context) with the inefficiencies generated by distortionary taxes. We use the 
same setup from Cont and Fernandez Felices (2016): a two-good, two-stage (successive 
oligopoly), two-province model, where each producer is located in a province and sells its 
product through exclusive retailers located in both provinces. Local governments raise 
taxes on wholesale/upstream and retail/downstream transactions that take place in their 
province.
We solve a welfare taxation problem, i.e., assuming symmetric provinces that seek to 
maximize local welfare non-cooperatively, subject to a given (equal for both provinces) 
revenue target. Then we study 1) the role of upstream and downstream tax rates on 
revenue (i.e., whether the extent to which they are substitutes); 2) the optimal upstream-
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downstream mix of tax rates under welfare taxation and the determinants of such a mix; 
and 3) in particular, the effect of product differentiation and revenue target on the mix.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the market setup, 
which is a symmetric version of the model introduced by Cont and Fernandez Felices 
(2016), and characterizes the equilibrium prices and quantities at retail and producer 
levels. Section 3 solves the non-cooperative welfare maximization problem, characterizes 
the solution, and discusses in detail the properties of optimal tax rates under different de- 
grees of product differentiation and revenue requirements. Section 4 compares the solution 
of this model with the one obtained with Leviathan (revenue maximizers) governments. 
Section 5 concludes.
2 Setup: model, equilibrium, taxes
2.1 The Model
Assume two producers of products A and B. Producer A is located in region /  province 
1, whereas producer B is located in region /  province 2. The length of time is such 
that location is given, i.e., producers cannot move across provinces. In order to reach 
consumers, producers sell their products to retailers in an upstream market. Retailers sell 
products to consumers in a downstream market. The structure is as follows.3
Producer A (located in region 1) sells its product to retailer 1A in region 1 (x1A) and 
retailer 2A in region 2 (x2A) at price pA. Total quantity of product A is xA =  x 1A +  x2A. 
Likewise, producer B (located in region 2) sells products to retailer 1B in region 1 and 
retailer 2B in region 2 at price pB. We assume that producers do not discriminate prices 
between regions. Total quantity of product B is xB =  x 1B +  x2B.
3 This paper considers a symmetric taxation problem. See Cont and Fernandez Felices (2016) for a 
full asymmetric model.
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Retailers in market i = 1 , 2 sell to consumers with demand
xij =  a -  pij -  7  (pij -  pik) (1)
where subscript i corresponds to provinces (1 or 2) and subscripts j, k correspond to prod­
ucts (either A, B or B, A). We assume a simple demand (1) (as that used by in Davidson 
and Deneckeree, 1985, to study merger among firms competing with differentiated prod­
ucts) to characterize the equilibrium based on market size (a) and the degree of down­
stream market-power linked to product differentiation (7 ). Consumer surplus CSij asso- 
ciated to demand (1) is CSij =  x j / 2(1 +  7 ). Retailers’ costs are C Tj(xij ) =  (pj +  cR) x ij 
and producers have marginal cost cP.
There are regional /  provincial governments that collect sales taxes. They can set rates 
on upstream sales (ri) and /  or rates on downstream sales (ti) within their jurisdiction. 
Tax revenues in provinces 1 and 2 are
R 1 =  T1xA +  ¿1 (x1A +  x 1B) =  (t1 +  ¿1)x1A +  ¿1x 1B +  T1x2A
R2 =  T2xb +  ¿2 (x2A +  x2b ) =  (T2 +  ¿2^ 2B +  ¿2x2A +  72x1 b
Revenues are collected on upstream and downstream sales of units produced and sold 
within the same province, upstream sales of units produced in the province but sold in 
another province, and downstream sales of units produced in other provinces and sold in 
the government’s province. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 characterize the market equilibrium and 
payoffs. Section 3 analyzes the taxation problem with local governments collecting taxes 
following a welfare objective.
2.2 Retailers equilibrium
Let the subindex j  (k) stand for product j  (k, respectively). Retailers’ profit is 
nij =  (pij -  cr -  ti -  pj) [a -  pij -  7 (pij -  pik)]
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Profit maximization and equilibrium at the downstream level leads to the following prices 
and quantities
2.3 Producers equilibrium
Constants ($, tf, r ) characterize the producer price, retail price and quantities in the 
no-tax equilibrium, and are defined in Appendix 6.1, equations (21)—(23). Parameters 
(a, P, p, k, p,a,8,9,u)  summarize tax incidence of corresponding rates, and are defined 
in Appendix 6.1, equations (15)-(20). Cont and Fernandez Felices (2016) explores tax 
incidence results for this model, which depend on the product-differentiation parameter
7 .
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(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Profit maximization and equilibrium at the upstream level leads to the following so- 
lution:
Notice that we set the same target on tax revenues -R -, for tractability. We want to 
explore how provinces choose upstream and downstream tax rates, looking for tax rev- 
enue in their own region or the other provincial region. A comparison with the Leviathan 
solution is left to Section 4.
Replacing (2)-(6) into profits, consumer surplus and tax revenue, welfare in province
1 is
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3 Welfare problem
We analyze the case of local (provincial) benevolent welfare functions
where tax revenue is
Welfare in province 2 is
where tax revenue is
Let h1 (h2) be the Lagrange multiplier for province 1 (2) revenue constraint. The first 
order conditions to welfare maximization are
Combining the first-order conditions of province 1 with respect to t i and Ti , and assum- 
ing interior solution for both instruments, it is possible to obtain an easy interpretation 
for the optimal balance of instruments for that province:
The numerator on each side of this equality represents the change in welfare of province 1 
due to a marginal change in one of the tax rates. The expression indicates that province 
1 should set tax rates so that the change in welfare per dollar of tax revenue is the same. 
This is a familiar result from the optimal taxation literature. A similar condition can be 
obtain for province 2.
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Given the symmetry of the problem and using the parameters of the model, the first 
order conditions reduce to
with equality of (8) or (9) if either t or t are positive. Three observations are in order. 
First, expression (10) reveals that t and t are perfect substitutes as instruments on the 
revenue side. That is, from (10) we have4
(11)
Second, equation (11) reveals that there is a bound on the maximum revenue obtainable 
by provinces, given market size (A) and the market conditions (^). Revenue requirement 
R cannot exceed ^A2/2. Figure 1 shows the combination of parameters y and R for which 
a solution to welfare taxation exists. The solid black line represents this upper bound on 
tax revenues given the differentiation parameter y . The upper bound increases with the 
parameter y as market power decreases with the degree of homogeneity of products, and 
hence the governments have more room to collect taxes.
Third, given that equation (11) defines (t +  t) as a function of R, the optimal combination 
of tax rates is determined by (8) and (9). It is useful to find the simplified version of 
condition (7) to characterize the solution to the taxation problem:
4 Equation (10) is quadratic on t +  t , and henee has two Solutions: the one shown in (11) and another 
in which the root is added to A. Starting from the solution located at the good side of the Laffer curve 
neither government finds profitable to increase tax rates. On the other hand, starting from the other 
possible solution (wrong side of the Laffer curve), governments find a profitable deviation by decreasing 
tax rates (which increase both revenue and welfare).
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(12)
where Fa =  Fa(y ) and Ft =  Ft(y ). That is, in a (possibly) interior solution equation 
(12) shows a linear relationship between tax rates. A complete definition of Fa and Ft is 
provided in equations (24) and (25) in Appendix 6.2.
Using equations (11) and (12) we can state the main proposition of this paper
P roposition  1 The solution to the welfare problem is a combination of tax rates t and t 
such that (11) and (12) are satisfied. There are three possible outcomes: (0, t ), (t, 0) or 
(t,T ) .
Proof: The proof is straightforward. From (11) and (12) it is easy to deduct that either the 
solution is interior (both rates that constitute the solution to both equations are positive) or 
corner (in which case either t or t  is zero). The characterization of the three possibilities is 
discussed below. Q.E.D.
According to this result, symmetric provinces setting tax rates simultaneously and 
non-cooperatively in order to maximize welfare subject to a given revenue constraint will 
find optimal to either raise revenue at only one link of the value chain (upstream or 
downstream) or use a combination of upstream and downstream taxation. This choice 
will be determined by the revenue requirement (R), the size of the market (A), and the 
degree of downstream competition (y ). Given the generality of the result, we proceed to 
characterize the solution for different levels of revenue requirement.
C orollary 1 If revenue requirement is low (R ^  0) governments raise upstream taxes 
for low values of y and downstream taxes for high values of y . Provinces do not mix tax 
rates.
This corollary states that for very low revenue requirements mixing tax rates is not part 
of an equilibrium. The explanation is as follows. Suppose that provincial governments 
need to raise taxes to get a (very low level of) revenue R. Then they have to decide on
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Figure 1: Solution to welfare taxation (as a function of y and R ).
whether set a positive upstream or downstream rate (or combination of both). Table 1 
summarizes the welfare effects of a marginal change in taxes at t =  t =  0 :
This table shows that the effect of t (t) is stronger on agents who are “closer” to the 
tax, and these are the consumers and the retailers (the producers). When products are 
differentiated (low y ) a downstream tax rate has a higher negative impact on welfare than 
an upstream rate because final prices are higher,5 favoring this way the use of upstream 
rates. But when product are more homogeneous (high y ) taxing the upstream segment 
unlevels the playing field, affecting negatively the good produced in the province that sets 
the upstream rate. This effect offsets the joint effect of downstream rate on consumers and
5 Suppose province 1 sets a $1 tax rate. The effect on final prices in this province is equal to 2a (6/8 
if y =  0) if the tax is set on downstream transactions, while it is equal to p +  a (1/4 if y =  0) if the tax 
is set on upstream transactions. Of course, there is an additional effect not captured by final prices in 
province 1 , corresponding to the quantities of product A in province 2 (included in nA). An increase in 
ti (ti) has an indirect positive (negative) effect on x2A, but this effect is dominated by the direct effect 
on final prices when y is low.
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Table 1: Welfare incidence of downstream and upstream taxes at t =  t =  0
retailers. Given the structure and parameters of the model, if 7 < (> )3 /4  governments 
start raising taxes by setting upstream (downstream) rates.
C orollary 2 If products have some degree of heterogeneity (y < ro) and revenue re­
quirement is above a certain threshold (R(7)), governments combine both upstream and 
downstream taxation. If products are homogeneous (7 ^  <x>), governments use only down­
stream taxation.
The dashed line in Figure 1 represents the threshold R(7 ), which decreases with 7 up 
to a certain value (near 3/4) and then increases in 7 . Suppose local governments face 
market conditions with low levels of 7 (say, below 3/4). Then, they will find optimal 
to use only upstream taxation up to the corresponding R(7 ) (white area in Figure 1). 
While in this area, as R is below the threshold, an increase in R forces local authorities 
to increase upstream taxes to meet the constraint, which generates a negative effect on 
welfare. At some level of R, the negative effect on welfare equals the negative effect of 
downstream taxes at t =  0. For higher values of R governments will find beneficial to 
start combining both tax instruments. This is represented by the dark grey area in Figure 
1.
In the specific case of 7 =  0, the value ü(0) that divides the area between upstream 
taxation and a combination of taxes is Jh-A2 (given a máximum revenue of A2/ 8). At the
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A similar reasoning applies for market conditions such that 7 > 3/4. In such cases, 
when revenue requirements are below R(7), it is optimal to collect taxes only at the retail 
stage. Increases in R in this region (light gray) implies a higher t, which reduces welfare 
increasingly, up to the point that governments switch to mixing rates (dark gray area). 
See Cases 2 and 3 in Figure 2. For example, if 7 =  1 , the value ü ( l )  that divides the area 
between downstream taxation and a tax mix is 0.0389.A2 (given a maximum revenue of 
0.194.A2). At the highest revenue requirement, the ratio T/t is about 214/171 ~  1.25. 
When products are less heterogeneous (7 =  10), the value 10) that divides the area 
between downstream taxation and a tax mix is 0.35.A2 (given a maximum revenue of 
0.37.A2). Notice that as 7 grows large the room for upstream rates diminishes significantly. 
Indeed, at the highest revenue requirement, the ratio T/t is about 12/38 ~  0.26. Finally,
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as 7 ^  ro (homogeneous products) the only instrument to raise taxes is at the retail 
level.
4 Comparison with the Leviathan problem
In Cont and Fernández Felices (2016) we analyzed the problem of two provincial gov- 
ernments raising taxes pursuing a goal of revenue maximization. We argued that in a 
competitive environment between provinces, Leviathan governments use a mix of taxes 
that depends on the degree of market competition. The tax mix is shown in Proposition 
2 for the symmetric case:
Proof: See Cont and Fernández Felices (2016).
The main contrasts between the welfare and Leviathan solutions are as follows. First, 
in the Leviathan symmetric solution, governments set a combination of taxes. This com- 
bination tilts towards upstream rates for low values of 7 and towards downstream for high 
levels of 7 . Second, Leviathan governments never rely 100% on upstream taxes, while Wel- 
farist governments only rest on upstream taxes when both revenue requirements and the 
degree of competition are low. Third, under different objectives (Welfare or Leviathan) 
governments raise 100% retail taxes when the degree of competition is high (in the Wel­
fare case, regardless of the revenue requirement). Fourth, Leviathan governments tax in
14
(13)
(14)
excess and achieve a revenue of
which is slightly less than ^A 2/2 (this is represented in Figure 1 by the dotted line slightly 
below the black solid line). This result is standard in the literature of non-cooperative 
tax setting. Therefore, the maximum tax revenue cannot be achieved in the Leviathan 
competitive solution. Lastly, when the revenue requirement is high, Welfarist governments 
tend to behave qualitatively similar to Leviathan governments. For example, the tax ratio 
r/t is approximately 2.2 for 7 =  0 (2 in the Leviathan case), 1.25 for 7 =  1 (1.27 in the 
Leviathan case) and 0.26 for 7 = 1 0  (0.35 in the Leviathan case).
5 Conclusions and future work
This paper analyzes multi-stage taxation by provinces in a federal country. In order to 
do so, we set up a two-good, two-province, two-stage successive differentiated-product 
oligopoly model, where each producer is located in a province and sells its product 
through exclusive retailers located in both provinces. Retailers compete for consumers 
a la Bertrand with differentiated products. The producer-retailer setup allows provin­
cial governments to raise taxes on both wholesale /  upstream and retail /  downstream 
transactions. With this model, we study Welfare taxation and compare results with the 
Leviathan case analyzed in Cont and Fernandez Felices (2016). We show that symmetric 
provinces choosing tax rates simultaneously and non-cooperatively in order to maximize 
welfare subject to a given revenue constraint find optimal to either collect taxes at only one 
segment of the value chain (upstream or downstream) or use a combination of upstream 
and downstream taxation. This choice will be determined by the revenue requirement, 
the size of the market and the degree of downstream competition. For a given revenue re­
quirement, upstream and downstream taxes are perfect substitutes on the revenue side, so 
the optimal mix ultimately depends on the relative effects of each instrument on consumer
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surplus and on profits obtained by producers and retailers.
When provinces need to raise low levels of revenue, they choose to collect taxes only 
at the producer level when the degree of downstream competition is sufficiently low, and 
at the retail level when the degree of downstream competition is higher. However, when 
governments require a level or revenue sufficiently high (that is, above a certain threshold 
determined by the degree of downstream competition), they choose a mix of upstream 
and downstream taxation. If products are homogeneous, the optimal policy is to tax only 
at the downstream level, irrespective of the revenue requirement.
Comparing the results of this model with the Leviathan case (Cont and Fernández 
Felices, 2016) the main conclusion is that, for a relatively high revenue requirement, 
welfarist governments tend to behave qualitatively similar to Leviathan governments: 
they both choose a combination of taxes if products have some degree of heterogeneity, 
whereas they rely on downstream taxation when products are homogeneous.
Some final observations are in order. Firstly, we focus the analysis on provincial gov- 
ernments within a country, but the main problem applies to national governments within 
a union. In particular, successive taxation was not considered so far in the analysis of ori- 
gin vs destination principles. Secondly, it is important to stress that imports and exports 
of tax bases can play an important role on tax policies by subnational governments, to the 
point that this effect should not be neglected and need to be balanced against the typical 
negative effects on welfare associated with these tax schemes. This effect is sufficiently 
important for provinces in Argentina to rely on the impuesto sobre los ingresos brutos 
as their main source of revenue, or for some states in the US to be reintroducing gross 
revenue taxes on their tax portfolio again.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Appendix A
Let the coefficients in (2)-(6) be as follows:
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
From section 2.3 we find FOC for pA and pB and solve for equilibrium prices. Let A =  
a — or — cp. The constant term (other than those multiplying tax rates) is
(21)
so that $  — cP =  25A.
Replacing pA and pB into p1A to p2B we get retailers prices. The constant term (other 
than those multiplying tax rates) is
(22)
(23)
17
6.2 Appendix B
First-order conditions (8) and (9) are linear in t and t . The intersection of both equations 
provide a linear relationship between both tax rates, as in (12), where
(24)
(25)
The solution is
Case: 7 = 1 .  Equations (11) and (12) simplify to
18
6.3 Appendix C
Therefore the solution is
7 References
Cont, W. and Fernandez Felices (2016), “Multi-stage taxation by subnational govern­
ments: Tax incidence and Leviathan taxation” , Anales de la Asociación Argentina de 
Economa Política (AAEP).
Deneckere, R. and Davidson, C. (1985). “Incentives to form coalitions with Bertrand 
competition” , The RAND Journal of Economics 16(4): 473-486.
19
Ebel, R., Luna, L. and Murray, M. (2016) “State general business taxation one more 
time: CIT, GRT or VAT?” , National Tax Journal, 69(4): 739-762.
Friedlaender, A. (1967). “Indirect Taxes and Relative Prices” , Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 81(1): 125-139.
Libonatti, O. (1998), “La imposicion sobre los ingresos brutos” , in La Reforma Trib­
utaria en Argentina, Tomo II, 301-326, Editorial FIEL.
Nunez Minana, H. (1994). “Finanzas Publicas” , Ed. Macchi, ASAP, Buenos Aires.
Piffano, H. (2005), “Notas sobre federalismo fiscal: Enfoques positivos y normativos” , 
PrEBi/SeDiCI (UNLP).
Porto, A., Garriga, M. and Rosales, W. (2014). “Impuesto a los ingresos brutos: ‘ave 
fenix’ de la estructura tributaria subnacional” , Estudios Economicos, XXXI(62): 49-86.
OECD (2015). “The OECD Classification of taxes” , Annex A to Revenue Statistics, 
1965-2014.
Tait, A. (1988), “Value-Added Tax: International Practices and Problems” , Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund.
20
